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1Conceptualising Work in Economics: Negating a Disutility
David A. Spencer

SUMMARY
This paper starts from the premise that economics has offered a one-sided conception of work.
Standard economic theory, specifically, has defined work as a means to income and consumption; it
has failed to grasp the importance of work as an end in its own right. The aim of the paper is to
develop an alternative conception of work that captures the formative impacts of work on the well-
being of workers. The paper firstly outlines and criticises the different definitions of the disutility of
work found in economics. It then offers a critical assessment of happiness research on work. The
idea that the effects of work on worker well-being can be captured by job satisfaction data and that
the importance of work can be reduced to a subjective feeling in the heads of individual workers –
two key aspects of happiness research – are challenged. The final part of the paper develops novel
ideas about how the economics of work should progress in the future. The section proposes a needs-
based conception of work and then uses this conception to make the case for collective intervention
aimed at enhancing the quality of work life.
ABSTRACT
Standard economic theory has stressed the functional aspects of work over its formative aspects.
This paper seeks to offer an alternative conception of work that captures the direct impacts of work
on the well-being of workers. It argues against the definition of work in terms of utility derived from
work and instead proposes a needs-based conception of work. The paper questions happiness
research on work and develops novel ideas about how the economics of work should progress in the
future. At a normative level, the paper makes the case for collective intervention aimed at enhancing
the quality of work life.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Standard economic theory has represented work as an instrumental activity, a means to income and
consumption, rather than an end in its own right. This representation of work has been underpinned
by the idea that work is a ‘bad’ or ‘disutility’ for which workers must be compensated. This paper
argues for an alternative conception of work that captures the formative impacts of work on the
well-being of workers.
Some recent research associated with the happiness economics literature has considered the
importance of work for worker well-being. It has been argued that work is a source of ‘procedural
utility’: workers are said to value work not just because of its material outcomes but also because of
its qualitative content (see Frey et al. 2004, Benz and Frey 2008). This paper seeks to go beyond the
above literature in two ways. Firstly, it questions the use of job satisfaction as a proxy measure of
the impact of work on worker well-being. Within happiness research, high reported job satisfaction
is seen as an indicator of the positive impact of work on worker well-being. For reasons that are
explained below, workers can report high job satisfaction when working in inferior conditions. The
paper argues that self-reported job satisfaction provides an unreliable and indeed often inaccurate
signal of the quality of workers’ lives at work. Secondly, it is questioned whether the impacts of work
can be reduced to the level of a feeling experienced by individual workers. It is proposed instead that
work be understood in terms of its role in meeting the needs, both material and creative, of
workers. In understanding how well work meets these needs, it is suggested that attention should
be focused on the actual objective conditions of work, rather than on the level of reported job
satisfaction of individual workers. The argument made about the importance of work in meeting
human needs is used to support the case for collective intervention aimed at enhancing the quality
of work.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II outlines and criticises the different definitions of the
disutility of work found in economics. Section III discusses the contribution of happiness research to
the study of work. Section IV sets out an alternative conception of work and draws out its normative
and policy implications. Section V offers conclusions.
II. WORK AS A DISUTILITY
Economics has traditionally viewed work as a disutility. It has been assumed that people work only
for the income it brings and that work itself brings no direct utility. However, while often overlooked
in the economics literature, different definitions have been attached to the disutility of work. Here
3attention is given to three prominent definitions drawing out their nature, differences as well as
problems.
1. A painful undertaking
The first definition says that work itself is a painful activity that people perform only out of necessity
or the desire to consume. The disutility of work, in this case, is defined by the pain experienced by
workers in the actual act of working. This idea finds particular support in classical economics. Adam
Smith, for instance, defined work as ‘toil and trouble’ (Smith 1976, vol.1, p. 47). Although Smith
recognised the human costs of the technical division of labour (Smith 1976, vol.2, p. 782), he
assumed that work would be a source of pain, even without the technical division of labour. Jeremy
Bentham agreed with Smith about the inherent painfulness of work. Humans, in his view, worked
only for the benefit of consumption and took no pleasure from work itself. In the words of Bentham
(1983, p. 104; emphasis in original), ‘Insofar as labour is taken in its proper sense, love of labour is a
contradiction in terms’. J.S. Mill concurred with this view, writing that: ‘Work, I imagine, is not a
good in itself. There is nothing laudable in work for work’s sake’ (Mill 1984, p. 90). The classical
economists, in general, saw the endurance of pain in work as a necessary and unavoidable cost of
economic progress (see Spencer 2009). Work was never good in itself; it was only ever a means to
something valuable.
The view of work as an inherent pain raises several issues and problems. One is the neglect of the
actual and possible intrinsic benefits of working. The fact that work can be and often is pursued for
its own sake rather than just for income is eclipsed. Secondly, there is no clear sense in which the
pain of work is connected to the structures and organisation of work. Pain is viewed as a feature of
all work, regardless of where or how it is undertaken. Smith’s appeal to the dehumanising effects of
the technical division of labour must be juxtaposed against his emphasis on work as all ‘toil and
trouble’. Work’s painful character appears to exist as a ‘law of nature’, not something linked to the
prevailing system of work. Thirdly, there is a lack of hope and indeed outright pessimism about the
prospects of erasing the disutility of work. The sense is that workers are destined to live out their
days enduring work as a pain. Missing is any reform agenda that seeks to bring meaning and
pleasure to work. Instead, there is an emphasis on higher consumption and longer leisure hours as
the only ways to raise human happiness. A world in which work itself is meaningful and enjoyable is
dismissed as hopelessly utopian.
42. A loss of leisure time
A second view of the disutility of work gained momentum and support following the emergence of
neoclassical economics in the late nineteenth century (see Spencer 2009). It has since become a
foundation for the standard labour supply model found in all economics textbooks. This view sees
work as an opportunity cost rather than as a pain cost. Work’s disutility is seen to derive from the
fact that it replaces hours of leisure, not from the fact that it is painful as such (see Benz and Frey
2008, p. 365). Indeed, this second definition of the disutility of work proceeds without direct
consideration of the costs (and benefits) of work itself; instead, what underlies it is the assumption
that leisure hours are a source of positive marginal utility – the assumption that leisure time is a
‘good thing’ is used to explain why work time is a ‘bad thing’.
The notion of work as an opportunity cost creates certain problems. Most obviously, it does not
consider the qualitative content of work and its effects on human well-being. It gives the impression
that workers are only concerned about the income they receive from work and the number of hours
they work. The work decision, in effect, is treated as a straight choice between two ‘goods’, namely
consumption and leisure time. There is no direct consideration of how workers value the work they
do, and how they are shaped by the actual experience of work (see Benz and Frey, 2008, p. 365).
Workers may earn the same income from work, and work the same number of hours, but value and
experience work very differently, due to differences in the qualitative content of their work. The
significance of these differences is missed in neoclassical economics, owing to its functional view of
work.
The basic textbook model of labour supply, to be sure, can be extended to include the fact that
workers have preferences for different types of work. The theory of compensating wage
differentials, for example, recognises that workers value different types of work and that their
preferences for work affect their wage demands. Workers who prefer intrinsically rewarding work,
for instance, are assumed to forgo higher wages to achieve their preferences. The problem with this
approach is that in practice workers cannot always be guaranteed to realise their preferences: low
pay, for example, is very often associated with dull and uninteresting work, contradicting the
outcomes predicted by the theory of compensating wage differentials. There is also the issue that if
the quality of work is important as a determinant of individual well-being it should be considered in
its own right, not just via its impact on relatives wages (see Benz and Frey 2008, pp. 365-66). The
theory of compensating wage differentials in this sense still only offers a very limited understanding
of how work impacts upon the well-being of workers. It also does not explain how work might be
5changed to improve the quality of work – indeed it works against this outcome, by assuming that
workers are allocated to types of work that match with their preferences.
3. The ‘shirking’ problem
The third definition of the disutility of work builds on the idea that all workers are compulsive
‘shirkers’. This approach does not directly address the pain of work or at least it does not privilege
the latter in defining the disutility of work. Nor does it give direct emphasis to the opportunity cost
of work time. Rather it focuses on the assumed shirking behaviour of individual workers. The
disutility of work is seen to reflect on the supposed natural aversion of workers to hard work – in
essence, it is viewed as a sign of laziness. This view of the disutility of work finds direct support in
transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985).
1
It also features in personnel economics via the
assumption that workers are averse to effort (Lazear and Shaw 2007).
The above approach presents several problems. Firstly, it fails to consider the social and institutional
context of work. The disutility of work is assumed to be fixed by nature, rather than explained as
context-specific (Edwards 1990). Secondly, it does not consider how workers might work for reasons
other than money. For example, workers may be driven to work by a desire to use valued skills and
competences. The treatment of workers as work-shy idlers fails to speak to the complexities of work
motivation (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2007). Thirdly, the assumption that workers are the villains of
the industrial piece presents an unbalanced and indeed biased view of the sources of work
resistance. In particular, there is no real sense that employers might prompt resistance to work via
their own actions towards workers. Fourthly, the focus on shirking behaviour by individual workers
places emphasis on control-type mechanisms as the only viable route to higher labour productivity
and makes other forms of labour management such as those based on widening democracy at work
appear as unviable or even counterproductive (Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton 2005). The hope of
building a more democratic workplace is thus extinguished. In this sense, there is no real advance
over previous conceptions of work in economics.
III. WORK REDUX: THE CONTRIBUTION OF HAPPINESS RESEARCH
The emergence and proliferation of happiness research since the 1990s has opened up new space
for the analysis of work and its connection to well-being in economics (see Frey and Stutzer 2002a,
Frey and Stutzer 2000b, Layard 2005, Kahneman and Krueger 2006, Frey 2008). This research,
1
Although arguing that opportunism is an inherent part of human nature, Williamson (1985, p. 261) tends to
see opportunism as a feature of the behaviour of workers, rather than employers. The need to project and
maintain a ‘good reputation’ is alleged to dissuade employers from acting opportunistically. Workers, by
contrast, are portrayed as incorrigible work avoiders.
6specifically, has encouraged economists to define the quality of work not just in terms of wages and
work hours, but also in terms of the satisfaction that workers gain from doing work (Blanchflower
and Oswald 1999, Clark 2001, Benz and Frey 2008, Clark 2011). This section focuses on the specific
contribution of happiness research to the conception of work, highlighting both its merits and
demerits.
1. Work and happiness
Happiness research within economics represents work as something that workers directly
experience as pleasurable or painful. The differences with the approaches reviewed in Section II can
be highlighted here. One difference is that work is regarded not just as a disutility but also as a utility
– work is not seen as inherently painful as in the pain cost definition mentioned above. Secondly,
unlike the opportunity cost definition, stress is placed on the direct impacts of work on worker well-
being – work itself is seen as a source of pain and pleasure for workers. Thirdly, there is no
assumption of universal shirking by workers – instead, there is the idea that work is or can be
pursued and enjoyed for its own sake. These ideas are used, for example, to explain why
unemployment imposes such high costs on workers – hence, the loss of the opportunity to work is
seen to magnify the costs of unemployment arising from the loss of income (e.g. Clark and Oswald
1996).
The impact of work on the well-being of workers is seen as directly measurable via the use of job
satisfaction data available from social surveys. These data are assumed to convey accurate
information about the quality of workers’ lives at work. If workers say they are satisfied with work,
this is assumed to reflect on their high level of utility (read well-being) derived from work.
By recognising the potential intrinsic worth of work itself, happiness research lends support to
various policies and reforms aimed at changing work and employment. It supports, for example, the
reduction of unemployment partly as a means to combat the non-pecuniary costs suffered by the
unemployed through the lack of access to work. It also encourages forms of work that can be
demonstrated to improve the job satisfaction of workers. Research, for instance, has shown how
self-employment is associated with high job satisfaction (Benz and Frey 2008). This finding has been
used to support policies aimed at encouraging self-employment. Other research that shows a
positive association between job satisfaction and labour productivity has been used to back different
reforms in the workplace (see Oswald et al. 2013).
72. Not happy ever after
Yet, for all its evident theoretical and practical benefits, happiness research also confronts some
problems of method and concept. Two problems can be highlighted here. The first relates to the
question of the measurement of the impact of work on worker well-being. Economics research on
happiness asks us to accept the validity of job satisfaction data as a measure of the well-being of
workers – high job satisfaction is seen to indicate high worker well-being, whereas low job
satisfaction is seen to indicate low worker well-being. This approach is problematic in several
respects. Here attention is given to issues relating to the responses given to survey questions that
form the basis of job satisfaction data. Firstly, how workers respond to questions about job
satisfaction in part reflects on what they expect to get from work. If workers expect very little from
work, they may report feeling satisfied with work even if the work they do lacks intrinsic and
extrinsic rewards – their high job satisfaction will reflect their low expectations in this case, not the
positive experience of their time at work. Secondly, workers’ reported job satisfaction is also
impacted by their outside opportunities. The fewer the outside opportunities available to workers,
the less likely they are to report their present jobs as dissatisfying. Relative to an even worse job or
unemployment, a ‘bad job’ can be rated as satisfying. Thirdly, there is the impact of what workers
perceive as normal. If social norms favour an instrumental view of work, then workers may be
forgiving of poor working conditions in their reports of job satisfaction. High job satisfaction may
simply reflect the impact of prevailing social norms and may not indicate the high well-being of
workers. Fourthly, workers have the capacity to adapt to adverse circumstances such that their
reports of job satisfaction may rise over time in spite of their facing real adversity in work. Adaptive
preferences, in this case, will cause job satisfaction to vary independently of the nature and
conditions of work.
The above points suggest how unreliable data on job satisfaction can be as a measure of the well-
being of workers. Due to the effects of expectations and norms plus adaptive preferences, job
satisfaction data may indicate the opposite of what is occurring in terms of the quality of workers’
lives at work. On the one hand, high reported job satisfaction may hide the fact that workers are
suffering real hardships at work. On the other hand, rises in reported job satisfaction may conceal
the fact that working conditions are getting worse such that the well-being of workers is declining.
As an example, consider the results of research on the job satisfaction of the self-employed. Such
research generally finds that the self-employed have high job satisfaction. One interpretation of this
result is that the self-employed have high well-being at work, due say to the high autonomy they
exercise over their work. Being one’s own boss offers ‘procedural utility’ and thereby raises
8individual well-being (Benz and Frey 2008). While this interpretation has a ring of truth, it cannot be
generalised across the self-employed. At least for some self-employed people, high reported job
satisfaction may reflect the lack of alternative opportunities; people who are pushed into self-
employment due to the lack of regular employment may compare their present employment
situation with unemployment and this may bias upwards their reports of job satisfaction. Assessed
against unemployment, self-employment may be regarded as a ‘good thing’. Self-employment may
also be viewed as less bad than a worse job in the regular economy. Research indeed shows that for
at least some people self-employment is a forced choice (see Dennis 1996); for these people, self-
employment may offer a way out of unemployment, but not necessarily a route to fulfilment, if the
work that is performed lacks certain characteristics. The point is that job satisfaction data does not
and cannot tell us categorically whether the self-employed (or any other workers) are able to
achieve high well-being at work. Indeed, in some instances, these data may conceal the fact that
people are facing a lack of choice in employment and possibly even poor working conditions.
Related to the above discussion, Block and Koellinger (2009) find that some self-employed people
report low levels of satisfaction.
2
These are people who become self-employed after a previous spell
of unemployment or due to a lack of better work opportunities. They are termed as ‘necessity
entrepreneurs’ given their lack of choice in becoming self-employed. This result is interesting in two
respects. One is that it suggests that adaptation effects for necessity entrepreneurs are not strong.
The fact that these entrepreneurs find themselves in work rather in a state of unemployment or in
worse jobs and the fact that they are able to exercise some choice over what they do at work does
not mean that they report high levels of satisfaction. To the contrary, despite these effects, it seems
that some objective features of work are so bad that these people report lower levels of satisfaction.
Secondly, the above result underlines the complexities that confront the interpretation of data on
self-reported satisfaction. To explain the lower reported satisfaction of necessity entrepreneurs,
Block and Koellinger (2009 pp. 205-6) are required to invoke the influence of unmatched aspirations
– that these entrepreneurs want regular work rather than self-employment. But if the explanation
about aspirations not being met has validity, as we would suggest it does, then this should lead us to
question the reliability of data on self-reported satisfaction – it suggests that reports of satisfaction
are biased by aspirations and that these reports can vary independently of the actual conditions of
work that affect what people can and cannot do and be at work.
2
Block and Koellinger (2009) focus on entrepreneurs’ satisfaction with their start-ups, rather than on their job
satisfaction. However, the issues raised by the interpretation of their data also carry over to job satisfaction
data.
9Benz and Frey (2008 p. 366) mention the fact that job satisfaction data may be subject to ‘reporting
biases’. Block and Koellinger (2009 p. 203) also suggest that their results ‘cannot rule out satisficing
or biased responses’. But this point is not pursued. Its implications for the interpretation (and
potential misinterpretation) of individual well-being is certainly not developed; instead, as with
other similar economics research in the area (e.g. Clark 2011), there is a tendency to proceed as if
data on self-reported satisfaction provide fully accurate information about the utility qua well-being
of respondents.
This paper proposes a different interpretation of data on job satisfaction. These data reflect on the
one hand workers’ subjective assessments of how well their lives at work are going and on the other
hand the influence of workers’ norms and expectations about work (see Brown et al 2012). In
reporting their job satisfaction, workers can be seen to make an assessment of how well the
objective conditions of work meet with their needs; this is to be differentiated from a subjective
assessment of utility derived from work that is the interpretation given in happiness research. This
assessment of how well work is going for workers can be seen as an indication of their well-being.
But workers’ reports of job satisfaction are also impacted by their norms and expectations. The
influence of norms and expectations, importantly, means that reports of job satisfaction are subject
to biases and can misrepresent the well-being of workers. When some workers say they are satisfied
with work, this may simply reflect their low norms and expectations and may actually disguise their
low well-being.
3
There is a sense in which job satisfaction data are always being assessed against some (objective)
standard of what high quality work is. High quality work is associated with factors such as high pay,
high autonomy, and high skill. If workers report high job satisfaction where these factors are
present, then the data are interpreted as meaningful. Where workers report high job satisfaction
where these factors are absent, the meaningfulness of the data is called into question. The point
here is that there is some way of gauging the quality of work independently of reports of job
satisfaction. For example, self-employment is viewed as high quality work because it provides
opportunities for autonomy. But if characteristics like autonomy are important to the quality of
work, then our primary focus should be on whether these characteristics are present in jobs, not on
the level of job satisfaction of individual workers. At best, job satisfaction data can confirm the
presence of high quality work. At worst, these data can lead us to think that work is high quality
3
Qualitative research has shown how workers offer different assessments of their well-being when offered the
opportunity to explain their responses to one-shot questions about job satisfaction used in surveys (see
Walters 2005, Brown et al. 2012). This research adds weight to the argument that job satisfaction data are
unreliable as a guide to worker well-being.
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when the reverse is true. These issues and problems with job satisfaction data, it can be argued, are
not fully appreciated in happiness research.
The second key problem with happiness research is that it seeks to reduce the importance of work
to the level of a feeling inside the heads of individual workers. Work is associated with ‘feeling good’
or ‘feeling bad’ (with such feeling usually measured by reported job satisfaction). How workers feel
about work is doubtless important, but there are other aspects to the relationship between work
and human welfare that ought to be considered. Indeed, these aspects matter a great deal when it
comes to how workers feel about work. The argument to be made here is that work matters to the
fulfilment of certain basic human needs. These extend from the need for consumption to the need
for autonomy and creativity. Work has a special role in human life because it provides a route both
to consumption and to self-realisation. Through working, people gain (or are denied) opportunities
to realise their material and creative needs and are able (or denied the opportunity) to achieve well-
being. The notion that work makes workers feel ‘good’ or ‘bad’ fails to get to grips with the
importance of work as it affects their identities, personalities, and freedoms. Happiness research
ultimately belittles work by seeing it in terms of a conduit to subjective feeling. Work is too earnest
and too profound an activity to be treated as just a feeling in the minds of individuals. Instead, it
must be understood in terms of its connection to the realisation (or non-realisation) of the needs of
people as creative and purposive beings. This point is further addressed in the next section, when
attention turns more directly to the nature and importance of work.
IV. RE-CRAFTING THE ECONOMICS OF WORK: BEYOND THE DISUTILITY OF WORK
The following discussion seeks to do two things. Firstly, it sets out the basis for an alternative theory
of work in economics. Secondly, it looks to address the case for collective intervention designed to
enhance the quality of work.
1. Theorising work: from working to live to living to work
Economics needs to recognise work not just as a means to income and consumption but also as a
formative activity that can have both a negative and a positive impact on human well-being. Work is
essentially a human activity – people are as much the output of the work process as the goods and
services they produce and deliver. Although economics may wish to focus on just the economic
aspects of work, it is evident that the process of work has non-economic significance. Indeed, in the
course of working to produce things of value, workers are themselves subject to changes that limit
or enhance their well-being independently of the consumption opportunities that work provides
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them with. Work is about more than just producing and delivering goods and services; its form and
content affects what kind of lives people are able to lead within and outside work.
A point to stress is that there is nothing inherent in work that turns it into a means only. Nor is there
anything inherent in human nature that turns people off work. To see work as just a disutility is to
miss its developmental and potentially creative elements. It is also to miss the needs of people for
work that is meaningful and life-enhancing (see Muirhead 2005). Where work is endured by
workers, this reflects on the way that work is organised and designed. What it demonstrates is the
need for reforms aimed at enhancing the quality of work.
It is also important to stress that work has impacts on people that extend beyond their level of
subjective experience. Work, in effect, impacts on the ability of people to learn and grow as human
beings. Where work is endured without intelligent action and creativity, it saps the physical and
mental energies of those performing it. Adam Smith illustrated the point well when he described
work under the technical division of labour as turning workers into ‘stupid and ignorant’ beings
(Smith 1976, vol.2, p. 782). Research has since shown how prolonged exposure to low skilled and
low autonomy work can undermine the intelligence of workers (Kohn and Schooler 1983). Evidence
from the UK has also shown how performing routine, low discretion work can undermine the
physical health of workers (Marmot 2006). Poor quality work may actually threaten one’s life. Work,
it can be argued, does not just affect how people feel; it also influences their health, both mental
and physical.
Two further points can be made here. The first relates to the definition of the quality of work. The
view taken here is that work quality is more an objective than a subjective construct. Following the
discussion above, it can be argued that work quality is already widely understood. Work’s quality is
judged by what it enables people to do and be. More specifically, in making such judgments,
attention is given to certain characteristics of work – whether it is high or low paid, whether it offers
low or high levels of autonomy, whether it is interesting or dull, whether it is skilful or routine, or
whether it is secure or insecure (see also Green 2006). The point here would be that the quality of
work life is and ought to be defined in relation to specific objective features of work – level of pay,
level of autonomy, level of interest, level of skill, and degree of security. How these features are to
be ranked will depend on particular circumstances – pay, for example, may assume greater
prominence where material deprivation through work is widespread. In a developing country
context, for example, the provision of a living wage may be given a high priority in the definition of
work quality. In richer countries, the focus may be on the freedom afforded by work and the level of
creativity in work. There are also issues over how each individual feature of work is to be measured.
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In the case of autonomy and security, for instance, there may be a requirement to use subjective
data that is subject to biases. But then the problem is one proxying the characteristics of work that
constitute the quality of work, not one of measuring subjective preferences per se.
There is the issue that evaluations of work quality can vary across individuals and that there may be
no consensus over what is (and is not) high quality work. Some people may value pay more highly
than other features such as autonomy over work. Imposing one universal definition of high quality
work would then result in the violation of some peoples’ preferences. Two responses to this issue
can be mentioned here. One is that preferences are adaptive. People may value pay more highly
than other intrinsic features of work simply because these other features are unavailable to them.
This does not mean to say that they do not need the said features and would not desire them if they
were more widely accessible. Secondly, it can be argued that enhancing the quality of work, say by
increasing autonomy over work, is beneficial to all workers. This argument can be justified by
considering the human costs of low autonomy work. Workers may prefer higher wages to
autonomous forms of work but the negative health effects of low autonomy work means that they
would be better off if they had the opportunity to work autonomously. The wider point here is that
people have needs for improved work quality even where they may hold preferences that suggest
otherwise. Again consideration of human needs rather than of subjective preferences should be our
guide in defining work quality.
The second point relates to the definition of what it means to be poor.
4
Conventional definitions of
poverty focus on the lack of income. The connection to work comes via the consideration of work as
a means to income. This definition has obvious relevance in so far as people are deprived of their
ability to meet basic needs if they have no or limited access to income. That is why in terms of
defining poverty it is important to consider the level of wages (as well as any social safety net for
those without paid work). But there are other aspects to consider as far as the deprivation of needs
is concerned. Being poor can be understood in terms of the inability to meet non-material needs in
and through work. It can mean, that is, the inability to work freely and creatively. Work may be
adequately paid, but still lead to hardship for workers via the deprivation of their needs for
autonomy and creativity. Poverty can mean that workers have little option to develop and exercise
their creative capacities; in other words, it can include work that is lacking in meaning and which is
experienced as enervating. The point is that the definition of poverty can be widened to encompass
not just low wages but also low quality working conditions encompassing low skilled and low
autonomy work.
4
The following argument overlaps with Levine and Rizvi (2005).
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2. Enhancing the quality of work – the case for collective intervention
The purpose of this section is to argue for collective intervention aimed at enhancing the quality of
work and thereby the well-being of workers. The argument is that such intervention is necessary
because by itself the market cannot deliver to workers the quality of work they want and need. In
economics, there is a tradition of assuming that workers can ‘choose’ jobs that match their
preferences. If workers want jobs that offer high intrinsic rewards, so the argument goes, all they
have to do is lower their wage demands to access such jobs. This line of argument is found in the
theory of compensating wage differentials and can be used to argue against labour regulation by the
state and other collective bodies. The problem with this theory, however, is that most workers are
not ‘free to choose’ jobs as they please. In the real world, they must take jobs or face
unemployment. Frequently workers face having to take jobs that fail to match with their
preferences. They also face taking these jobs with no accompanying financial compensation. In the
labour market, power resides with employers and workers often have to settle for jobs they wish
were otherwise. This fact means that the collective regulation of work is important to meet workers’
preferences for work. Work quality does not improve just because workers want it to improve but
rather its improvement often stems from the interventions of the state and trade unions to protect
and promote labour standards.
Two objections to collective intervention aimed at improving the quality of work can be mentioned
here. One is that such intervention would violate the preferences of some workers who have no
interest in higher quality work (for an argument along this line, see Nozick 1974). The counter to this
argument, as mentioned above, is that these workers may have adapted their preferences to the
absence of high quality work. There is no reason why they would not demand such work if it was
encouraged by collective action. Further, even if workers have acquired for non-adaptive reasons
preferences that do not support the pursuit of higher quality work, it can still be argued that they
would be better off if collective action was taken to improve the quality of work. This argument is
based on the established evidence that low quality work undermines the health and well-being of
workers (see Schwartz 1982; Murphy 1992). On the grounds of promoting health and well-being, in
short, the state can be seen as justified in pursuing measures designed to promote higher quality
work.
The second objection is that collective intervention to improve work quality would add to firm costs
and ultimately lower profitability. One response to this objection is that firms have a moral
obligation to provide high quality work and that they should be prevented from compromising the
quality of work in the interests of profit creation. Another response is that firms can create or at
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least maintain profits via measures to raise the quality of work. Such measures, by adding to the
morale and motivation of workers, can add to labour productivity and in turn raise profitability.
There is evidence that more human-centred forms of management can work to improve labour
productivity (Pfeffer 2007). Where firms have the option to implement these policies but decline to
do so, in this case, they can be seen as foregoing the opportunity to lower unit labour costs.
5
State
intervention may be important then in encouraging employers to implement measures that raise
both the quality of work and the productivity of workers.
The pursuit of high quality work by collective intervention, it can be argued, is about meeting the
fundamental needs of people for a work life that is enriching and fulfilling. It is about creating an
environment in which people can meet their needs not just as consumers but also as producers; it
means providing the opportunity for people to work with the necessary freedom and creativity that
enables them to achieve well-being. How exactly the state should intervene to increase the supply of
high quality work is something that cannot be gone into detail here, though it is evident from the
arguments made above that any genuine and systematic improvement in the quality of work will
entail a gamut of policies ranging from the enforcement of basic labour standards such as health and
safety at work to more radical policies aimed at democratising work.
V. CONCLUSION
The narrow depiction of work in economics, as argued in this paper, has come at a price. On the one
hand, it has prevented the uncovering of the real hardships of work faced by many workers. On the
other hand, it has blocked the identification and promotion of policies aimed at improving the
quality of work life. The ‘work as disutility’ idea has persisted in economics despite its failure to
capture the true importance of work in human life.
The rise of happiness research, to be sure, has helped to broaden the nature and scope of the
economics of work; however, it also contains some weaknesses of concept and method. This paper
raised issues with the use of job satisfaction data as a measure of the well-being of workers and also
questioned the treatment of work as a source of ‘procedural utility’. The argument has been made
that economics needs to embrace a radically different conception of work that takes into account
the importance of work in meeting the needs of workers. A need-based conception of work should
replace approaches that emphasise the subjective feelings or utility of individual workers.
5
As Pfeffer (2007, p. 115) puts it, ‘in spite of the fact that much of what is required to build engaged and
successful organizations is at once well-known and not always costly to implement, many, maybe most,
organisations have failed to take appropriate actions, thereby, in some sense, “leaving money on the table”’.
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The ideal would be for economics to embrace an account of work that not only situates work in
relation to human needs and their fulfilment but also seeks to promote changes in the nature and
conditions of work that have as their ultimate goal the improvement in the quality of work life. More
generally, with a strategic eye on relevant policy and political debates, a rejuvenated economics of
work would be focused on humanising work, making it fit for people as consumers as well as
workers. Living to work rather than working to live would be a fitting leitmotif for a new and
enlightened economics of work.
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